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1 Introduction
Should gene sequences be patentable?
This question is at the heart of a heated debate between Myriad Genetics, a Salt Lake City based
rm, and a large group of European based institutions, lead by the Curie Institute, the Assistance
Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris, and the Gustave-Roussy Institute. Myriad Genetics obtained two
patents from the United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce on genes BRCA1 and BRCA2 ,
both linked to a predisposition to breast and/or ovarian cancer. In 2001 the rm developed
diagnostic tests for these genes and obtained three supplementary patents granted by the European
Patent O¢ ce (EPO). Because Myriad Genetics refused to grant licenses on genes BRCA1 and
BRCA2, patent protection e¤ectively permitted Myriad Genetics to exert monopoly power on
genetic testing. The European institutions questioned Myriad Genetics policy on various grounds.
Arguments brought forward include in particular that a monopoly on genetic testing is unethical
per se and disables institutions other than the patent holder from performing research building on
the gene sequences. Moreover, the markups charged by Myriad Genetics were seen as out of line
with Santé Publique goals in France. In late 2001, the European institutions led a complaint to
the EPO and in 2005, the EPO essentially revoked Myriad Genetics patents on genes BRCA1 and
BRCA2. Myriad Genetics appealed in late September 2007, but to date the EPO has maintained
its decision to revoke the patents.1
One di¢ culty in the debate is probably the diversity of arguments in favor and against patent
protection for gene sequences. The conventional economic argument in favor of patent protection is
that some prots must be guaranteed to the innovator in order to give private rms an incentive to
conduct research in the rst place. Arguments against patent protection in the particular case are
based among other things on ethical and public interest grounds. In view of the perceived wisdom,
our contribution is perhaps surprising: we show that there may in fact be no conict between the
private goal of prot maximization and the public goal of increasing welfare (in the broad sense).
In other words, private, prot maximizing rms may prefer to have no patent protection for gene
sequences, because their ex ante expected prots without such Intellectual Property Rights are
higher.
The genes BRCA1 and BRCA2 in our opening anecdote have per se no commercial value,
but they are a necessary tool to construct tests, which do have commercial value. Intermediate
1A summary of the European position can be found in a Curie Institute press release (2nd Oct 2007), available
at http://www.curie.fr/home/presse/communiques.cfm/lang/_fr.htm
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inventions or discoveries that are valuable primarily for subsequent innovations have been termed
research tools (Nass and Stillman (2003)). Examples include databases and reagents, that is
substances used in chemical reactions. The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework to
assess the optimality of patent protection for such research tools. While it is clear who wins and
who loses when a patent is led or revoked ex post, it is less clear what the e¤ects of patent
protection versus non-protection on ex ante prots and welfare are. We show that both rms
ex ante prots as well as consumersexpected welfare can be higher in a regime without patent
protection on research tools.
In our model two ex ante identical rms race for a nal innovation. To complete the innovation,
a research tool has to be found rst. The research tool has no commercial value but is a necessary
ingredient for a valuable innovation that uses the tool. With patent protection, the rm that
nds the research tool rst completes the second phase of research unchallenged by the other
rm. Without patent protection, both rms can use the research tool regardless of which one
found it in the rst phase of the race. Patent protection versus non-protection of the research
tool is subject to the following trade-o¤. With patent protection, the inventor of the research tool
enjoys a relatively high expected prot when doing research for the nal innovation, because the
competing rm lacks an essential ingredient to complete the innovation. On the other hand, both
rms have high incentives to nd the research tool, because the rm that is too slow to develop
the tool will be excluded from the second, decisive phase of the race. This is costly because rms
are trapped in a situation where they invest excessively. Without patent protection, rms face
low incentives in the rst phase of the race, because they can use the research tool even when the
rival develops it; but on the other hand the expected prot of a rm engaged in research for the
nal innovation is relatively low because there is now competition at the second stage. We show
that, depending on the value of the nal innovation, rms may prefer the regime without patent
protection. The benecial cost saving in the rst phase of the race due to a reduction of research
incentives outweighs the ex post loss induced through competition in the second phase of the race.
Moreover, the overall expected time to make the nal innovation available to consumers is shorter
without patent protection; hence consumers prefer to have no patent protection for research tools.
The literature on innovations is vast, so we only mention the main building blocks of our
analysis here. Patent protection is generally seen as a necessary evil to generate incentives for
innovations. If rms were unable to appropriate any rents from their innovations, they would have
no incentive to invest into research in the rst place. Hence, innovations would remain undiscovered
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and consumers would lose their part of the surplus. Hence, from a welfare perspective patents of
limited length can be seen as the prize society o¤ers to rms to generate incentives for research.
This reasoning relies crucially on the assumption that innovations are one-shot; it does not apply
in our multistage innovation framework.
We follow Grossman and Shapiros (1987) approach of a stochastic two-stage research and de-
velopment race where arrival times of innovations follow independent Poisson distributions. We
view patent protection from a property rights perspective à la Grossman and Hart (1986). A main
theme in the property rights literature is how under-investment can be overcome by e¢ ciently
allocating property rights. In contrast to this, we nd that property rights may generate overin-
vestment - a familiar result from the patent race literature. Hence, the absence of property rights
may become optimal.
Closest in spirit to this result is Bessen and Maskin (2008), which analyzes costs and benets
of of patent protection when innovation is sequential and complementary and imitation is costless.
Bessen and Maskin show that innovators in a sequential patent race might be better o¤ without
patent protection, because incentives for research are enhanced without patent protection. While
the absence of property rights serves exactly the opposite purpose in our paper - as a device to
coordinate on a more e¢ cient equilibrium with lower research expenditures - we nd as they do
that rms may prefer to have no property rights.
Multi-stage patent races have previously been analyzed by Scotchmer and Green (1990) and
Green and Scotchmer (1995). Scotchmer and Green (1990) nd that patenting interim knowledge
is benecial because it accelerates aggregate innovation through disclosure of inventions. The
di¤erence to our approach is the strength of patent protection: while they assume that patenting
around an invention is possible, we assume that patent protection is su¢ ciently broad. Green
and Scotchmer (1995) argue for a strong patent protection in a cumulative innovation process.
However, they assume sequential innovations are undertaken by di¤erent rms, while we allow for
patent races at each stage of the innovation process. Similar to our approach, though di¤erent in
focus, is Denicolò (2000), which shows that in a sequential two-stage patent race a weak patent
protection for nal innovations may be better than a strong protection. The di¤erence to our paper
is that we take patent protection for the nal innovation as given and vary the patent protection
of intermediate results.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we lay out the main model and describe the
basic trade-o¤ between the two regimes with and without property rights. In section 3, we analyze
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this trade-o¤ in detail and characterize the optimal patent policy. We provide a welfare analysis
and discuss extensions in section 4. All proofs have been relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
Two rms race to nd an innovation that generates a ow prot  to the innovator. The innovation
is protected by an innitely-lived patent, so the value of nding the innovation to the innovator is
 = r ; where r is the interest rate, assumed to be su¢ ciently small, in a sense to be claried as
we go along. Finding the innovation takes two steps. The rst is an intermediate step of research
- inventing a research tool - and the second is nding the actual innovation. We assume that the
intermediate step has no intrinsic value; however, the step is essential for the overall innovation
process in the sense that a rm that does not complete the rst step cannot complete the nal
step at all.2
Firms choose in each phase of the race a research intensity that determines the likelihood of a
success. Time is continuous and the arrival time of a rms innovation follows a Poisson distribution
with parameter ih; i = 1; 2 denoting rms and h = 1; 2 denoting stages (or phases) of research:
Firms have available in each phase three pure strategies; they can drop out, they can innovate
with a hazard rate of  at ow cost c, or they can innovate with a hazard rate of  at a ow cost




c : We allow for mixed strategies between the two strategies contingent on participation and
let zih denote the probability that rm i chooses the relatively fast and costly innovation strategy.3
Hazard rates and ow costs are then given by
 (zih)  zih+ (1  zih) and c (zih)  zihc+ (1  zih) c for all zih 2 [0; 1] : (1)
We will useW to denote ex ante values at the beginning of phase one, and V to denote continuation
values at the beginning of phase two. R 2 fP;Ng will denote regimes, with P denoting the property
right (on the research tool) regime and N denoting a regime without property rights on research
2Thus, we assume that the follower cannot innovate around the patent. Indeed, Scotchmer (2005) has argued
that the patent claim is deemed to cover any product that does the same work in substantially the same way to
accomplish substantially the same result (Scotchmer, 2005: p. 69).
3This formulation of the race follows Loury (1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Lee and Wilde (1980) and
Reinganum (1982). The race is standard due to its analytical convenience, although it has some well known
unpleasant features; e.g., there is no memory. We restrict attention to stationary policies, because it is well known
that optimal strategies are stationary in this model.
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tools. We let V +R denote the continuation value of the rm that has invented the research tool in
regime R; V  R denotes the continuation value of the rm that has not invented in phase one. The
ex ante value of the race for rm i can now be written as









V  R  WiR (zj1)
  c (zi1)	 dt: (2)
(2) states that over a small time interval of length dt the return to holding a claim on rm is
assets must in equilibrium be equal to the real return the rm obtains over the same interval of
time. With likelihood  (zi1) dt; the rm successfully innovates and the rms value jumps up to
V +R . Firm j innovates with likelihood  (zj1) ; in which case rm i loses its current value and gets
continuation value V  R . The ow costs of innovation over the interval of time are c (zi1) dt. Note
that the continuous time formulation implies that events where both rms innovate at the same
time have measure zero.4 Dividing by dt on both sides of (2) ; and rearranging, we can solve for
WiR (zj1) :




R +  (zj1)V
 
R   c (zi1)
r +  (zi1) +  (zj1)
(3)
The numerator of (3) is the instantaneous net return of rm i; the denominator is the e¤ective
discount rate which adjusts the time preference by the expected length of the race. We will adopt
formulations similar to (3) in what follows without further discussion.
The value of the inventor of the research tool in the regime with patent protection depends
on whether the rm chooses to license its research tool to the other rm and if it does so, on the
licensing fee. We assume that rms engage in Nash bargaining to determine the licensing fee. Let
Vm denote the value of a rm that continues searching optimally for the nal innovation while
the other rm drops out of the race and let Vd denote the equilibrium value of a rm searching
optimally for the innovation when the other rm stays in the race. Standard Nash bargaining gives












(2Vd   Vm) ; 0

: (5)
Each rm obtains the value of its outside option plus one half of the additional surplus created
through a licensing arrangement. To keep our analysis as simple as possible, we will assume that
4The continuous time formulation is convenient because it gives rise to tractable value functions. However,
it should be stressed that time plays no crucial role in our model. Everything we wish to show could also be
demonstrated with a simple two period model. However, the alternative model would be much less convenient to
handle analytically.
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2Vd   Vm < 0; so no licensing will occur in equilibrium. This assumption captures the essence of
the Myriad Genetics example. Moreover, for our purpose - to establish a possibility result - the
assumption is not restrictive.5 The condition 2Vd   Vm < 0 amounts to a restriction on ; the
value of the nal innovation. We characterize the restriction explicitly below. For the time being,
it su¢ ces to note that V +P = Vm and V
 
P = 0: In case there is no patent protection, we simply
have V +N = V
 
N = Vd:
We will restrict attention throughout our analysis to symmetric equilibria. Let zR1 denote the
equilibrium strategy contingent on participation in phase 1. The induced equilibrium hazard rate
and ow cost are denoted accordingly. We can write the ex ante rm value in the regime with
patent protection for research tools as
WP =
P1 Vm   cP1
r + 2P1
: (6)
and in the regime without patent protection for research tools as
WN =
2N1 Vd   cN1
r + 2N1
: (7)
The di¤erence to (6) is that the rm obtains continuation value Vd regardless of which of the two
rms invents the research tool, which implies rstly that the continuation value is Vd instead of
Vm and secondly that the likelihood of arrival is the joint likelihood that at least one of the rms is
successful. Finally, in the rst regime, the value is evaluated at equilibrium zP1 while in the latter
regime the equilibrium is zN1 : Firms prefer the regime without property rights on research tools if
and only if the di¤erence
WN  WP = 2
N




1 Vm   cP1
r + 2P1





the right-hand side, so we have
WN  WP = 
N
1 (2Vd   Vm)
r + 2N1| {z }
ex post e¢ ciency e¤ect
+




1 Vm   cP1
r + 2P1| {z }
ex ante incentive e¤ect
: (8)
The comparison of regimes is driven by the following trade-o¤. On the one hand, the absence of
property rights on research tools induces an ine¢ cient number of participants in the second phase
of the race. Under our assumption that 2Vd Vm < 0 the joint value of both rms would be larger
5We sketch at the end of the paper how the analysis extends to the case where ex post licensing occurs in
equilibrium.
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when only one rm enters the second phase of the race, but without patent rights on the research
tool both rms have access to the essential input. We term this an ex post e¢ ciency e¤ect and
note again that this e¤ect is negative by assumption. On the other hand, the equilibrium choices
in the rst phase of the race depend on the regime. We term the e¤ect on these equilibrium choices
an ex ante incentive e¤ect. The rms can only prefer regime N if the ex ante incentive e¤ect is
positive; that is, if the absence of property rights induces more e¢ cient equilibrium choices in the
rst phase of the race.
3 Analysis
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of our model. Our method of proof is entirely constructive:
to prove the possibility result that rms may prefer the regime without patent protection on
research tools, we show that there are values of  that satisfy all restrictions we introduce. In
particular, and among other things, we will show that there is a range of values for  such that at
the same time the ex post e¢ ciency e¤ect is negative and the ex ante incentive e¤ect is positive.
3.1 The ex post e¢ ciency e¤ect
Consider rst the regime with patent rights on the research tool. To make the analysis non-trivial
we assume that the value of the innovation is su¢ ciently high, so that continuing the research is
better than dropping out in any phase. In particular, the value is high enough to make the rm
willing to continue its research in phase two,  > c . The rms optimal research intensity solves
Vm = max
z2
 (z2)  c (z2)
r +  (z2)
(9)
where we dropped the rm index i because there only is one of them. The optimum is generically
attained at a boundary. The solution is zP2 = 0 for   m and zP2 = 1 for  > m, where
m 
(r + ) c   r +  c
r
 
   : (10)
Next, consider the regime without intellectual property rights on research tools. In the subgame
following the discovery of the research tool, rm i0s optimal research intensity is a solution to the
problem
Vd (zj2) = max
zi2
 (zi2)  c (zi2)
r +  (zi2) +  (zj2)
(11)
The di¤erence to (9) is that the value of rm i drops to zero if rm j innovates rst. Depending on
the value of ; the subgame has either multiple equilibria or a unique equilibrium. Manipulating
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(11) for zj2 = 0; we nd z12 = z22 = zN2 = 0 is an equilibrium for   0d, where
0d 
(r + 2) c   r + +  c
(r + )
 
   : (12)
Likewise, z12 = z22 = zN2 = 1 is an equilibrium for   1d; where
1d 
 
r + + 





We observe that 0d > 
1
d: Hence, for  > 
0
d; the subgame has a unique Nash-equilibrium, which
is z12 = z22 = zN2 = 1: We will focus on this case. It is easy to verify that m > 
0
d: For values
of  that satisfy 0d <  < m; competition induces rms to speed up the innovation process
in the sense that each of them invests more than it would in the absence of competition. Since
overinvestment is a robust feature of the race environment, we will restrict attention to values of





As we have argued above, it simplies our analysis if licensing does not occur on equilibrium





the no property right regime is zN2 = 1 and the equilibrium in the property right regime is z
P
2 = 0;
we can evaluate the equilibrium continuation values in (9) and (11) and nd 2Vd   Vm < 0 if and
only if  < ~; where







   : (13)
To complete the proof that the ex post e¢ ciency e¤ect may indeed be negative for a non-empty
set of values  we need to show that the restrictions 0d <  < m and  < ~ are consistent with
each other.









; the ex post e¢ ciency e¤ect is negative, 2Vd   Vm < 0:
The proof in the appendix is constructive. We show that for small enough values of r; the
relevant boundary values satisfy 0d < ~ < m: The intuition for this result is that the Nash
equilibrium in our race features excessive investments. Overinvestment occurs when zN2 = 1 and
zP2 = 0 and in addition, a cooperative investment choice of rms in the regime without property






Proposition 1 has two implications. From a positive perspective, it implies that licensing will
not occur on equilibrium path if the inventor of the research tool has patent rights on the research
tool. From a normative perspective, Proposition 1 says that the absence of property rights on the
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research tool implies a loss of value ex post, because too many rms enter the second phase of the
race.
3.2 The ex ante incentive e¤ect
We consider next the ex ante incentive e¤ect. Given a negative ex post e¢ ciency e¤ect, we need to
show that the ex ante incentive e¤ect can be positive for the values of  that satisfy our restrictions.






N1 Vm   cN1
r + 2N1
>
P1 Vm   cP1
r + 2P1
: (14)
The expression on the right-hand side of (14) is the ex ante value of a rm in the regime featuring
property right protection for the research tool. Obviously, this value is computed using the true,
symmetric equilibrium choice in this regime, zP1 : The value on the lefthand side of (14) is a hypo-
thetical value computed using the symmetric equilibrium choice zN1 but still the continuation value
Vm: Thus, the ex ante e¢ ciency e¤ect is positive if the rms in the property rights regime would
prefer the equilibrium induced in the regime without property rights. Intuitively, we expect this
to occur if zN1 < z
P
1 ; that is when the property rights regime induces ine¢ ciently high equilibrium
investments.





, the rst stage
equilibrium choices in the no-property right regime are zN1 = 0: Manipulating (3) for z1j = 0 and
V +N = V
 
N = Vd; we nd z
N
1 = 0 is a Nash-equilibrium if
Vd  V 0d 
(r + 2) c   r + +  c
r
 
   : (15)
Indeed, this equilibrium is unique if zN1 = 1 is not a Nash-equilibrium (as this also implies that
there is no mixed strategy equilibrium and no asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies); zN1 = 1
is not a Nash-equilibrium if
Vd  V 1d 
 
r + + 

c   r + 2 c
r
 
   : (16)
It is easy to see that V 0d < V
1
d : Hence, it su¢ ces to check whether the inequality is satised at the
highest possible value of Vd that is consistent with Proposition 1. Indeed using (13) and (15) ; one
can verify that Vd = 
~ c
r+2
 V 0d :
Consider now the rst stage equilibrium choices in the regime featuring patent rights for research
tools. We obtain the rmsobjective functions by substituting V +P = Vm and V
 
P = 0 into (3) :
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We observe that the structure of the rms problem is identical to (11) with  replaced by Vm:
Hence, the structure of the equilibrium set is the same as well. We state without further proof

















m is equivalent to  > 
; where
  (r + 2) (c  c)

 
   : (17)
And indeed for small enough values of r; we have  < ~:




such that for  2
; ~

; the ex ante incentive e¤ect is positive.
The intuition for the result is straightforward. Firms in the regime with property rights pro-
tection play an equilibrium with high investments into innovations. But, as we show in detail in
the proof of the proposition, this corresponds to overinvestment for the values of the innovation
we focus on: Hence, rms have (collectively) a preference for the action prole z1 = 0; but this is
not a Nash-equilibrium. Economically, Proposition 2 states that property rights for the research
tool create too much incentives for research in the rst phase of the race.
3.3 Comparison of Regimes
We can now substitute for all equilibrium values in (8) to prove the following Proposition:




; rms prefer to have no patent
protection for research tools.
Property rights on research tools induce wasteful overinvestment into nding the research tool.
On the other hand, the absence of property rights induces an ine¢ cient race structure in the second
phase of the race. However, the former e¤ect outweighs the latter, so rms have a preference to
share research results obtained during the rst phase of the innovation.
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4 Extensions and Discussion
4.1 Welfare
It is easy to incorporate welfare considerations into our analysis. Since the nal innovation is
protected by a patent in both regimes, market prices for consumers are the same in both regimes.
Hence, what matters to them is only how fast the nal innovation is found. In the regime without
patent protection, the expected length of the rst phase of the race is 12 as rms free ride on the
other rms e¤ort to nd the research tool. The expected length of the second phase is 1
2
as rms
invest ine¢ ciently high amounts into research for the nal innovation. In contrast, in the regime
with patent protection, the expected length of the rst phase is 1
2
; while the expected length of
the second phase is 1 : Adding the expected length of the entire two step innovation, shows that
the nal innovation is found faster when there are no property rights on the research tool. We
state this result in the following Proposition:




, consumers are better o¤ without
patent protection for research tools.
4.2 Ex Post Licensing
We have chosen parameters the way that licensing does not occur on equilibrium path. Clearly
this captures only a subset of cases of interest. However, it clearly captures the example of Myriad
Genetics we started out with. Moreover, we merely want to demonstrate that rms may prefer to
have no property rights on research tools. Hence, we can just as well restrict attention to the case
where no ex post licensing occurs, given that it is analytically convenient to do so. However, one
may still wonder how our analysis is a¤ected by this restriction. Allowing for ex post licensing to
occur - that is to analyze our game for a di¤erent set of parameters - makes the e¤ects we discussed
less pronounced, but conceptually the analysis remains valid. Interestingly, the trade-o¤ can be
reversed. That is, the sign of the ex ante and ex post e¤ect may be reversed. In cases where this
reversal occurs, patent protection for research tools is optimal.6
6Discussing all cases results in a rather tedious case distinction, which we have done, but chose to not expose
here. The interested reader can obtain results from the authors upon request.
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4.3 Discussion
We have shown that a weakening of patent protection for research tools may enhance welfare.
This is in contrast to the common wisdom that patent protection is welfare enhancing because it
generates positive incentives to engage in research in the rst place. Our ndings are in agreement
with those of other recent studies that also emphasize the benets of weak intellectual property
rights, notably Denicolò (2000), Anton and Yao (2008), and Bessen and Maskin (2008). These
results seem surprising from the viewpoint of the property rights and incomplete contracting liter-
ature (Grossman and Hart (1986)), where property rights are used to increase ex ante investment
incentives that are generally suboptimally low. In contrast, no property rights are preferable in
our context, precisely because rms are induced to waste less resources this way.
We do not view our results as supportive of a major redesign of current patent policies. First,
because there are parameter values in our model where the regime with patent protection is prefer-
able. Second, even if patent protection is in place and enforced, rms can nd ways to contract
around it. In particular, rms can and do sign in practice ex ante licensing agreements. E.g., Anand
and Khanna (2000) nd that in the chemicals industry 23% of licensing contracts are signed before
the development of the technology. In general, we expect ex ante licensing agreements to work well
if the set of potential users is known ex ante and reasonably small. However, for research tools
that are likely to be used widely, our results shed doubts on the optimality of patent protection.
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5 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. Substituting for the equilibrium choices, we have





We observe that 2Vd   Vm < 0 if and only if  < ~; where ~ is dened in (13) :
For consistency with our equilibrium construction, we also require  > 0d; as dened in (12) :
These restrictions dene a non-empty set only if ~ > 0d; that is, if
c (2r + 2)   r + 2 c
r+ r
 
   > (r + 2) c 
 






This is equivalent to  
c  c  r2 + 2r  2+ 22 > 0;
which is satised for r < ~r, where ~r is the non negative solution to ~r2 + 2~r   2+ 22 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that our conditions are met by a non-empty set of




( ) , it is easy to see that
 > 0d: We next show that ~ > 
 for r su¢ ciently small. Indeed,
 =
(r + 2) (c  c)

 







   = ~
if and only if r < r, where r is dened as the nonnegative solution to
r2 +

2 (c  c)  c    
(c  c)  2   r  
 
    c  c 2
(c  c)  2   = 0:






















which is equivalent to  < ; where
  (r + 2)
 
r + + 

c   r + 2 c
r
 
   : (18)
To complete the proof, we show that  > ~: Recall that m > ~; where m is dened in (10) :
Hence, it su¢ ces to show that  > m: Substituting from (10) and (18) ; we nd  > m i¤
(r + 2)
 
r + + 

c   r + 2 c >  (r + ) c   r +  c :
Since (r + 2) >  and
 
r + + 

c   r + 2 c > (r + ) c  r +  c by the fact that c c >
0; this condition is indeed met.
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We observe that WN  WP > 0 if and only if  > ^; where
^  c  (r + ) (c  c)

: (19)
To complete the proof, it su¢ ces to show that
^ =
c  (r + ) (c  c)

<
(r + 2) (c  c)

 
   = : (20)
Using the fact that c  c > 0; it is easy to show that condition (20) is indeed met.
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